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Abstract
The (Strong) Free Will Theorem of Conway & Kochen (2009) on the one hand follows
from uncontroversial parts of modern physics and elementary mathematical and logical
reasoning, but on the other hand seems predicated on an undefined notion of free will
(allowing physicists to ‘freely choose’ the settings of their experiments). Although
Conway and Kochen informally claim that their theorem supports indeterminism and,
in its wake, a libertarian agenda for free will, inferring the former from the Free Will
Theorem is a petitio principii (as has been pointed out before). Of course, this also
considerably weakens the case for the latter (at least from the theorem).
A recent reformulation of the Free Will Theorem due to Cator and the author
(2014) uses a mathematically precise formulation of the idea that experimentalists
freely choose their settings even in a deterministic world, and thence construes the
theorem as providing constraints on determinism (as opposed to proving indetermin-
ism). In the present paper we argue that the concept of free will used in this version
of the theorem is essentially the one proposed by Lewis (1981), also known as ‘local
miracle compatibilism’. To do so, we give a mathematical reformulation of this idea,
which we believe to be well within its spirit and which may be of independent interest.
On this double reformulation the Free Will Theorem shows that local miracle com-
patibilism contradicts the parts of modern physics used in its assumptions. Therefore,
although the intention of Conway and Kochen was to support free will through their
theorem, what they actually achieved is the opposite: a well-known, philosophically
viable version of free will now turns out to be incompatible with physics!
Keywords: Free Will Theorem, Local Miracle Compatibilism
∗Dedicated to Henk Barendregt, on the occasion of his official retirement (October 1, 2015).
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1 The Free Will Theorem
The Free Will Theorem (fwt) of Conway & Kochen (2006, 2009) shows that some small
and uncontroversial corner of quantum mechanics (i.e., the response of massive parti-
cles with spin one to measurements of their spin) combined with a rather weak locality
condition suggested by Einstein’s theory of special relativity (which effectively forbids su-
perluminal signaling), is incompatible with the conjunction of determinism and the ability
of experimentalists to ‘freely choose’ the directions along which they measure spin.1
Conway and Kochen (2009) paraphrase their theorem in the following way:
‘if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have
their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the ex-
perimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus
in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the
universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous
history of the universe. (. . . ) our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a
certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed,
it is natural to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of
our own. (. . . ) Granted our three axioms [i.e., the physical ones and freedom
of choice], the Free Will Theorem shows that nature itself is nondeterministic.’
One wonders if such far-reaching conclusions are warranted by the actual technical content
of the Free Will Theorem. In particular, although the joint assumption of determinism
and freedom (of the kind summarized above) is also made in the famous paper by Bell
(1964),2 this conjunction is especially uncomfortable in the setting of the fwt, whose very
emphasis on free will in an attempt to refute determinism seems almost self-contradictory
(though in fact it is not, as we will show). The authors already anticipate criticism of this
kind on the very first page of their first paper (Conway & Kochen, 2006), writing:
“‘I saw you put the fish in!” said a simpleton to an angler who had used a
minnow to catch a bass.’
Indeed, also after more serious philosophical analysis, Wu¨thrich (2011) concluded that:
‘Their [Conway & Kochen’s] case against determinism thus has all the virtues
of theft over honest toil. It is truly indeterminism in, indeterminism out.’
Our formulation of the fwt (Cator & Landsman, 2014) avoids this criticism, as the original
allusion to undefined free will in allowing arbitrary settings of the experiment has been
replaced by explicit (super)determinism including the settings, to subsequently recover
the situation of the original fwt through a natural independence assumption. Moreover,
it has the advantage of clearly stating the assumptions on which the proof is based. Thus
we show that rather than “indeterminism in, indeterminism out”, the thrust of the Free
Will Theorem is really: “determinism in, constraints on determinism out’ ’.
1The fwt was published in two versions, of which the second, called the Strong Free Will Theorem
by Conway and Kochen, has superseded the first (which may therefore be discarded). Analogous results
had previously been published by Heywood & Redhead (1983), Stairs (1983), Brown & Svetlichny (1990),
and Clifton (1993), of which only the first paper was cited by Conway and Kochen. Moreover, the close
relationship to Bell (1964), whose assumptions and conclusions are quite similar to those of the fwt (cf.
Bassi & Ghirardi, 2007; Cator & Landsman, 2014), might have been acknowledged in their papers. Indeed,
the main novelty of the fwt lies in the emphasis Conway and Kochen (unlike the other authors mentioned
in this footnote) put on free will. We also refer to Goldstein et al (2010) for a critique of an extension of
the fwt to stochastic theories (by which Conway and Kochen apparently overplayed their hand).
2In whose context the tension between causality and freedom is discussed in Seevinck & Uffink (2011).
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2 Compatibilist free will a` la David Lewis
The question arises which philosophical notion of free will is among the assumptions of
the (thus revised) fwt.3 Determinism being among the other assumptions, the answer
must surely lie in the compatibilist direction. Indeed, we argue that more specifically we
are close to the well-known ‘local miracle’ variant thereof due to Lewis (1981).4 Following
Moore (1912, Ch. 6) and many others in his wake, Lewis attempts to make sense of the
intuition that even in a deterministic world one in principle has the ability to act differently
from the way one actually does, despite the fact that the latter was predetermined. A
standard example is that Alice’s hand still rests on the table, although she was able to
raise it. However, she could not have raised it with a speed greater than that of light, so
her ability remains constrained by the laws of nature. In Lewis’s phrasing (which, as we
shall see, we regard as somewhat misleading), there is a fundamental difference between:
• I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken.
• I am able to break a law.
According to Lewis, the latter is impossible (which seems uncontroversial) but the former is
not (which needs explanation). The first possibility rests on the theory of counterfactuals
of Lewis himself (1973, 1979), according to which the antecedent ‘if I did it’ leads me to
consider the possible world in which doing ‘something’ is actually possible, whilst as many
other things as possible are kept the same as in the actual world (the precise underlying
measure of similarity is not important here). However—and this a potential source of
confusion—the conclusion that ‘a law would be broken’ refers to the actual world: the
world in which ‘I did it’ is a different one. Thus although Lewis’s position is often called
local miracle compatbilism, a miracle takes place neither in the actual world where Alice’s
hand is at rest nor in the possible world where she raises it. In other words, a law is
broken neither in the former nor in the latter world. As Beebee (2013, p. 62) explains:5
3Though taking a different turn, our analysis below was significantly influenced by ‘t Hooft (2007).
4It has been said that Lewis’s paper is ‘the finest essay that has ever been written in defense of
compatibilism—possibly the finest essay that has ever been written about any aspect of the free will
problem’ (van Inwagen, 2008). For a recent introductory survey of the field see Beebee (2013).
5Analogously in Beebee (2003, pp. 261–262). Unfortunately, confusion may arise if the above quotation
‘if I did it, a law would be broken’ from Lewis (1981) is subjected to the following explanation:
‘On Lewis’s account of counterfactuals, the truth conditions for counterfactuals—what makes
them true—are as follows. Suppose we have the counterfactual ‘if A had been the case, B
would have been the case’ (so if A is ‘I miss the bus’ and B is ‘I’m late’, this counterfactual
just says, ‘if I’d missed the bus, I would have been late’). This counterfactual will be true
if and only if, at the closest possible world to the actual world at which A is true, B is also
true. So, our sample counterfactual, ‘if I’d missed the bus, I would have been late’, is true
if and only if: at the closest possible world to the actual world at which I miss the bus, I’m
late.’ (Beebee, 2013, p. 60).
Removing any possible remaining doubt, on p. 62 she mentions that the closest possible world where I miss
the bus is the world w. According to this explanation, then, Lewis’s sentence ‘if I did it, a law would be
broken’, would mean that at the closest possible world to the actual world in which I did it, a law is broken,
i.e., in w. But according to Beebee’s definition quoted in the main text of what Lewis means by a miracle,
apparently this is not the right reading (and indeed it would, in our view, be nonsensical). Moreover, Lewis
(1981) emphasizes that in the first bullet point in the main text above—which he defends—it is not the
agent who would break a law, whereas in the second bullet point —rejected by Lewis—it is; in the first it
is the breaking of some law at an earlier time that enables the agent to do what she, in our actual world,
did not do. We stick to the interpretation in our main text, regarding Lewis’s phrasing as awkward.
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‘This is what Lewis means by a ‘miracle’: an event M is a miracle if and only
if M occurs at possible world w, and M is contrary to some actual law (or
combination of laws) L. The point here is that while M is a miracle in Lewis’s
sense, it is not contrary to any of w’s laws of nature. At w, L simply isn’t a
law in the first place. So, as things actually happened—in the actual world—L
is a law, and m does not occur, so there is no miracle in the usual sense of
‘miracle’. m is only a ‘miracle’ in Lewis’s special sense of ‘miracle’: something
(m) happens in w that is contrary to the laws of nature in the actual world.’
Vihvelin (2013, pp. 164–165) states Lewis’s first bullet point as the following conjunction:
1. Slightly Different Past: If I had raised my hand, the past would still have been
exactly the same until shortly before the time of my decision.
2. Slightly Different Laws: If I had raised my hand, the laws would have been ever
so slightly different in a way that permitted a divergence from the lawful course of
actual history shortly before the time of my decision.
This way of paraphrasing Lewis leads to a point that merits discussion. Throughout his
analysis, Lewis takes a “miracle” to be a change in the laws of nature. Alternatively, the
difference between the actual world in which Alice rests her hand and the possible world
in which she raises it might be attributed to a change in the state of the world.6 Lewis
(1981) rejects this possibility, referring to his (1979) for an explanation. Here we read:
‘the way the future is depends counterfactually on the way the present is (. . . )
[much as] the present depends counterfactually on the past (. . . ) [but] not
so in reverse (. . . ) we ordinarily assume that facts about earlier times are
counterfactually independent of the supposition and so may freely be used as
auxiliary premises.’ (Lewis, 1979, pp. 455–456).
Lewis (1979) therefore proposes the hypothesis of Asymmetry of Counterfactual Depen-
dence, suggesting that ‘the mysterious asymmetry between open future and fixed past is
nothing else than the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence’ (p. 462). If this hypothesis
is true, it would add a “philosophical” direction of time to the “physical” ones that have
been proposed since the time of Boltzmann, cf. Price (1996), Zeh (2007), and Callender
(2011). From the point of view of determinism as commonly understood in physics (Ear-
man, 2007), however, at least the laws of nature are time-symmetric.7 In view of this,
unlike Lewis himself we are open to the second way in which Alice could (counterfactually)
have raised here hand, namely through an instant (counterfactual) change in the state of
the world, as in Bennett (1984). This has been explicated by Vihvelin (2013, p. 165), too:
1. Same Laws: If I had raised my hand, the laws would still have been exactly the
same.
2. Completely Different Past: If I had raised my hand, past history would have
been different all the way back to the Big Bang.
6In the philosophical literature this is called backtracking, cf. e.g. Lewis (1979) and Kapitan (2002).
7At least in so far as they apply to everyday situations relevant to the free will debate, hence excepting
some eccentric corners of elementary particle physics involving CP -violation, accessible only in accelerators.
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Here we would actually prefer to write Different Past, since even though in this scenario
the state indeed (by determinism rephrased as the uniqueness of the solution of the equa-
tion of motion for the state of the universe with given value at any fixed time) would have
been different all the way back to the Big Bang, the entire trajectory of the world may
or may not be close to the actual one, in some suitable metric. In this scenario, the two
cases Lewis distinguishes take the following form:
• I am able to do something such that, if I did it, the state of the actual world at some
earlier time would have been different.
• I am able to change the state of the actual world at some earlier time.
The latter remains impossible (like breaking a law), whereas it is the former that gives
rise to free will.8 Had he preferred this second scenario, Lewis (1981) would have been
entitled Are we free to change the states? instead of Are we free to break the laws?
Thus there are two different ways in which possible world w (in which Alice lifts her
hand) could differ from the actual world (in which her hand is at rest): either there is
some minor change in the law governing the time-evolution of the universe (typically given
by a small change in the Hamiltonian local to Alice), or, with fixed time-evolution, there
is a minor change in the state of the world (again typically local to Alice at least at the
time she thinks about what to do with her hand). Both would be acceptable to modern
physics and of course, a mixture of these possibilities might be considered, too
3 Compatibilist free will revisited
Either way, as a considerable literature suggests (e.g., Fischer, 1994; Beebee, 2003; Oakley,
2006; Graham, 2008; Pendergraft, 2011), the tension between determinism and freedom
remains worrying. To relax it, we we will now present a simple mathematical framework
that captures the spirit of compatibilist free will a` la Lewis, including the idea of agency
(which is an important aspect of free will). Here the intuition is that free will involves
a separation between the agent, Alice, (who is to exercise it) and the rest of the world,
under whose influence she acts. Namely, let X be the state space of the world, and let
I : X → XI ; (3.1)
O : X → XO (3.2)
be variables that describe the agent and the rest of the world, respectively; here XI is some
set of “inner states” of the agent, whereas XO consists of “outer states” of the world.
9 Let
XA be some set whose elements denote possible actions a of the agent, and let
A : X → XA (3.3)
be the function that describes which action
a = A(x) ∈ XA (3.4)
the agent takes if the world is in state x. We assume that
A = A(O, I), (3.5)
8As noted by Vihvelin (2013, §6.2), this still suffices to undermine the Consequence Argument.
9A special case one may have in mind here is X = XI ×XO, where I and O are projections onto the
first and the second factor, respectively. However, in general XI and XO need not exhaust X.
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in the sense that each action a = A(o, i) is a response to both the outer state
o = O(x) (3.6)
of the rest of the universe (perhaps restricted to some relevant part) and the inner state
i = I(x) (3.7)
of the agent. More precisely, there exists some function
Aˆ : XO ×XI → XA, (3.8)
such that for each x ∈ X one has
A(x) = Aˆ(O(x), I(x)). (3.9)
Determinism of Alice’s behaviour, briefly called Determinism in what follows,
is expressed by the above framework, combined with the usual assumption of (Laplacian)
determinism,10 stating that there is a dynamical law ϕ : X×R→ X, satisfying ϕ(x, 0) = x
and ϕ(ϕ(x, s), t) = ϕ(x, s + t). Thus Alice’s behaviour a at time t is determined by the
state x0 of the world at any time t0 in the past (or future) through (3.9) with
x = ϕ(x0, t− t0). (3.10)
Freedom is our second fundamental assumption underpinning compatibilist free will.
It states that O and I are independent (or that o and i are free variables), in the sense
that for each (o, i) ∈ XO × XI there is x ∈ X for which (3.6) and (3.7) hold, i.e., the
following function is surjective:
O × I : X → XO ×XI
x 7→ (O(x), I(x)). (3.11)
Rephrasing our earlier analysis in this elementary mathematical language, Lewis wants
to make sense of the idea that:
• Although (according to determinism) Alice’s action a = Aˆ(o, i) at some fixed time t
is determined by the state x of the world at that time through (3.9) and hence—this
is the whole point of the so-called Consequence Argument Lewis challenges—through
(3.10) it was determined also by any earlier state x0 of the world at time t0;
• Nonetheless, Alice was able to act otherwise at time t, e.g. she was able to do
a′ = Aˆ(o′, i′), (3.12)
but did not do so, because doing a′ would illegally have changed the state x.
10Compare with a typical philosopher’s definition, e.g.: ‘determinism is the thesis that for every instant
of time t , there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant, and if P and Q are
any proposition that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of P together
with the laws of nature entails Q’ (Vihvelin, 2013, p. 3). Thus P and Q correspond to our states x at
different times, and ‘the laws of nature’ are combined into our function ϕ. What we have added to this in
our definition is that the state x not only determines future (and past) states, but also controls what is
going on, such as Alice’s actions, namely through functions like A. Without these, states mean nothing.
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Alice’s ability to do a′ now simply means that there exists a state x′ of the world close to
x in the sense that
o′ = O(x′) = O(x) = o, (3.13)
making the outer environment in which Alice acts the same as in the actual world, but
i′ = I(x′) 6= I(x) = i, (3.14)
where i′ should be similar to i in some appropriate sense (such as a slight change in the
state of Alice’s brain), such that (3.12) holds. The point, then, is that according to our
Freedom assumption, there indeed is such a state x′, for any given i′ and (o, i). Thus the
freedom the agent has is precisely what we have formalized as Freedom: even given the
state o of the external influences on her behaviour (and possibly even the state of the rest
of the world), there is a different admissible state x′ of the world such that, had this state
been actual, the agent would have done a′ (although she in fact, necessarily, did a). Since
the actual world at time t resides in state x, the state x′ (at the same time) pertains to
a possible world w different from the actual. The difference between the two scenarios
discussed in the previous section just lies in the story of how w was led to state x′: either
the law ϕ (Lewis) or the state (Bennett) changed ever so slightly prior to time t.
4 The Free Will Theorem revisited
In this section we show that in the context of the Free Will Theorem, the freedom of choos-
ing settings for experiments which Conway and Kochen attribute to physicists is precisely
of the above compatibilist nature. The theorem then establishes a contradiction between
the physics assumptions and the compatibilist free will assumption, so that (accepting just
a small but fundamental corner of modern physics), the latter must fall.
The setting of the Free Will Theorem of Conway & Kochen (2009) was introduced by
epr (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, 1935) and further studied by Bell (1964) and others.
In current jargon two physicists, called Alice and Bob, are far apart whilst performing
simultaneous experiments on some correlated two-particle state (their measurements need
to be spacelike separated). In the situation considered by epr each particle had a spatial
degree of freedom and hence required an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space for its descrip-
tion, but the thrust of the argument comes out more clearly if each particle merely has
an internal degree of freedom (and is “frozen” otherwise). Bell (1964) considered a pair
of spin- 1
2
particles, each of which has Hilbert space C2, but because of its reliance on
the Kochen–Specker Theorem (which fails for C2) the Free Will Theorem requires one
dimension more, i.e., H = C3, seen as the state space of a massive spin-1 particle.11
For our purposes, all we need to know is that the experiment has settings (a, b) “freely
chosen” by Alice and Bob, respectively,12 and outcomes in the form of triples λ, since in
fact Alice and Bob each perform three simultaneous measurements.13 Defining
Λ = {(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}. (4.15)
11The price of this extra dimension is that the experiment whose outcome provides the empirical input
for the Free Will Theorem has not actually been performed, except at a single wing (Huang et al, 2003).
However, the predictions of quantum mechanics are uncontroversial and will serve as input instead.
12In the context of the fwt the settings are frames, i.e., orthonormal bases of R3 defined up to a sign.
13If a = (~u1, ~u2, ~u3) is the basis chosen by Alice, she measures the three observables (J
2
~u1
, J2~u2 , J
2
~u3
),
where J~u is the angular momentum of the particle along the unit vector ~u. Likewise for Bob.
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quantum mechanics prescribes that each outcome λ of such a triple measurement must
lie in Λ (so that, in particular, each single measurement of the three performed by both
Alice and Bob must have outcome 0 or 1). Furthermore, on a specific choice of the corre-
lated two-particle state,14 quantum mechanics predicts perfect correlation of measurement
outcomes in case that the settings of Alice and Bob agree.15
The Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen (2009) states that three assumptions
called spin, twin, and min, which we will recall below, imply that the response of a spin-
one particle to the kind of experiment described below ‘is not a function of properties of
that part of the universe that is earlier than this response (. . . ).’ This formulation contains
an implicit assumption of determinism, whose precise nature only becomes clear from their
proof, and which is akin to our formulation below, except for the crucial difference that
the function they allude to only acts on the particle variables and not on the settings of
the experiment, of which Conway and Kochen just say that the experimenters can ‘freely
choose’ them. As explained in §1, we (and others) consider this unsatisfactory.
We therefore first state a revised set of assumptions.
• Determinism of measurement outcomes, briefly called Determinism in what
follows, means that there is a state space X with associated functions
A : X → XA, B : X → XB, F : X → Λ, G : X → Λ, Z : X → XZ , (4.16)
where XA = XB is the set of settings available to Alice and Bob and Λ is some set
of possible outcomes, which completely describe the experiment, in the sense that
each state x ∈ X determines both its settings
(a = A(x), b = B(x)), (4.17)
and its outcome (both in Alice’s lab and in Bob’s lab)
(λ = F (x), γ = G(x)). (4.18)
The function Z describes all relevant physical variables except Alice and Bob,16 and
should also be chosen (by the theory in question) in such a way that
F = F (A,B,Z); (4.19)
G = G(A,B,Z). (4.20)
More precisely, there exist certain functions
Fˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → Λ; (4.21)
Gˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → Λ, (4.22)
such that for each x ∈ X one has
F (x) = Fˆ (A(x), B(x), Z(x)); (4.23)
G(x) = Gˆ(A(x), B(x), Z(x)). (4.24)
As in the previous section, these rules should be supplemented with Laplacian de-
terminism in order to deserve the name “Determinism” and have the right interpre-
tation, but the above is what is needed in the proof of the Free Will Theorem.
14Namely, ψ0 = (~e1 ⊗ ~e1 + ~e2 ⊗ ~e2 + ~e3 ⊗ ~e3)/
√
3, where (~e1, ~e2, ~e3) is the standard basis of C3.
15Writing b = (~v1, ~v2, ~v3) for Bob’s basis, perfect correlation here means that if ~ui = ~vj , then the
measured value of Alice’s observable J2~ui , which is 0 or 1, always coincides with Bob’s J
2
~vi
.
16The parameter space XZ includes the state of the pair of particles but its precise form is irrelevant.
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• Freedom then states that A, B, and Z are independent in that for each (a, b, z) ∈
XA ×XB ×XZ there is an x ∈ X for which A(x) = a, B(x) = b, and Z(x) = z.
• Nature requires that Λ is given by (4.15), and that perfect correlation holds.
• Locality makes F (A,B,Z) independent of B and G(A,B,Z) independent of A.17
In other words, sharpening (4.19) - (4.20), we actually have
F = F (A,Z); (4.25)
G = G(B,Z). (4.26)
We then have the following version of the Free Will Theorem (Cator & Landsman, 2014):
Determinism, Freedom, Nature, and Locality are mutually contradictory.
We refer to the paper just cited for the proof; after some new initial steps, the argument
quickly reduces to the one due to Conway & Kochen (2009), whose assumptions are a
subset of ours: their spin and twin are the first and second half of our Nature axiom,
whilst their min expresses a form of context locality as well as the loose assumption that
Alice and Bob may ‘freely choose’ their settings a and b, respectively. Accordingly, in
terms of our notation, Conway and Kochen only use the parameter space Z, rather than
the full state space X we need in order to consistently axiomatize determinism.18
5 Conclusion
Our technical (re)formulations of both local miracle compatibilism (cf. §2) and the Free
Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen (in §4) show that the freedom Alice and Bob enjoy
in choosing their settings is precisely an instance of the kind of free will proposed by Lewis
(1981). More precisely, the mathematical analogy is between:
• The triple (o, i, a) ∈ XO × XI × XA in the philosophical analysis of Alice’s “free”
choice of either resting (a) or raising (a′) her hand—now seen as her choice for either
the actual setting of her experiment or some other—as determined by the outer state
o of the world and her own inner state i. Thus a is her actual setting, predicated on
the state x ∈ X and hence on (o, i) = (O(x), I(x)), which finally yield a = Aˆ(o, i).
• The triple (a, z, λ) ∈ XA × Z × Λ in the experimental setting of the fwt, where a
is the setting of Alice’s wing of the experiment (which from the perspective of the
spin-1 particle plays the role of the outer state of the world), z is the inner state of
the particle, and λ is the outcome of Alice’s measurement.
In the spirit of Conway and Kochen, in the above analogy the Alice of the first bullet point
(whose “free will” they after all believe to be ultimately a consequence of the “free choice”
17A more precise name for this condition would be Context locality, distinguishing it from various other
notions of locality such as Einstein locality (Haag, 1992), which is satisfied in quantum field theory, or Bell
locality (Bell, 1990), which quantum mechanics violates. There is a probabilistic version of Contextlocality,
called No signalling (or, for hidden variable theories, Parameter Independence), which holds in quantum
mechanics. Context locality seems the weakest locality condition one may reasonably impose.
18In any case, the essence of the proof lies in the argument that perfect correlation together with locality
implies non-contextuality.
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of elementary particles, cf. §1) plays the role of the spin-1 particles in the second bullet
point. Conversely, the Alice of the second point is like the observable O in the first, which
determines the external situation to which our particle responds (namely the setting a of
the experiment, whose role in the first point is played by the outer state o of the world,
to which Alice responds). Thus our analogy holds both mathematically and conceptually.
Granting this analogy, the Free Will Theorem establishes a contradiction between:
• the physics assumptions, i.e., Nature and Locality ;
• the compatibilist free will assumption, i.e., Determinism and Freedom.
Accepting the former, the latter must fall. Making this choice, one should realize that the
physics assumptions on the one hand form just a small corner of modern physics (from
which point of view they are weak), but on the other hand have singled out the corner in
which the two fundamental theories of quantum mechanics and special relativity meet and
are brought to a head (from which perspective they are strong). Either way, despite the
lack of explicit experimental backing (which is available for Bell’s Theorem),19 few people
would be willing to reject these physics assumptions (and in any case the exercise is to
determine what modern physics has to say about free will, which presupposes the former).
Thus the irony is that although the outspoken intention of Conway and Kochen was
to support free will through modern physics (and elementary logic), what they actually
achieved is the opposite: one of the few philosophically viable versions of free will (Vihvelin,
2013) has now been shown to be incompatible with quantum theory and relativity.20
Although we find this conclusion worth pointing out, in all honesty it is hardly sur-
prising: for according to Maudlin (2007), Lewis’s “Humean supervenience” program, into
which his theory of free will seems firmly embedded, is at odds with modern physics
anyway, especially with the quantum-mechanical assumption in the fwt. So we agree.
19The set of outcomes (4.15) at each wing has actually been experimentally vindicated (Huang et al,
2003), but the correlations between the outcomes of Alice and Bob have not been, so far.
20To their defence, it is fair to say that Conway and Kochen never intended to support compatibilist
free will in the first place. It is hard to find more scathing comments on compatibilism than the following
ones by Conway: ‘Compatibilism in my view is silly. Sorry, I shouldn’t just say straight off that it is silly.
Compatibilism is an old viewpoint from previous centuries when philosophers were talking about free will.
The were accustomed to physical theory being deterministic. And then there’s the question: How can
we have free will in this deterministic universe? Well, they sat and thought for ages and ages and ages
and read books on philosophy and God knows what and they came up with compatibilism, which was a
tremendous wrenching effect to reconcile 2 things which seemed incompatible. And they said they were
compatible after all. But nobody would ever have come up with compatibilism if they thought, as turns
out to be the case, that science wasn’t deterministic. The whole business of compatibilism was to reconcile
what science told you at the time, centuries ago down to 1 century ago: Science appeared to be totally
deterministic, and how can we reconcile that with free will, which is not deterministic? So compatibilism,
I see it as out of date, really. It’s doing something that doesn’t need to be done. However, compatibilism
hasn’t gone out of date, certainly, as far as the philosophers are concerned. Lots of them are still very keen
on it. How can I say it? If you do anything that seems impossible, you’re quite proud when you appear to
have succeeded. And so really the philosophers don’t want to give up this notion of compatibilism because
it seems to damned clever. But my view is it’s really nonsense. And it’s not necessary. So whether it
actually is nonsense or not doesn’t matter.’ (Conway, quoted in Roberts, 2015, pp. 361–362).
Or, in rather more academic parlance: ‘The tension between human free will and physical determinism
has a long history. Long ago, Lucretius made his otherwise deterministic particles swerve unpredictably
to allow for free will. It was largely the great success of deterministic classical physics that led to the
adoption of determinism by so many philosophers and scientists, particularly those in fields remote from
current physics. (This remark also applies to “compatibilism”, a now unnecessary attempt to allow for
human free will in a deterministic world.)’ (Conway & Kochen, 2009).
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